Ποιοι το υπογράφουν; τι επιδιώκεται με την
ανάλυση αυτή των πανεπιστημιακών; Tο κείμενο που ακολουθεί και αποκαλύπτεται (σήμερα στο σύνολο του) φαίνεται πως
θα κρίνει τις εξελίξεις του Σκοπιανού ζητήματος.
Το συγκεκριμένο
κείμενο ετέθει υπόψη της Ελληνικής πλευράς (Νίκο Κοτζιά) και των
Σκοπιανών(Πρωθυπουργό Ζάεφ) μάλιστα δεν είναι τυχαίο ότι λίγο μετά την
δημοσιοποιήση του το επίσημο πρακτορείο (ΜΙΑ) του γειτονικού κρατιδίου του το
υιοθετεί και το παρουσιάζει.
Η
επιστημονική επεξεργασία έγινε στο Πανεπιστήμιο
της Οξφόρδης ενώ όταν δόθηκε το πράσινο φως από την
Ελληνική πλευρά(Γιάννης Κοτζιάς) το εν λόγω "επιστημονικό πόνημα"
υιοθετήθηκε και το από τη γνωστή ευρωπαϊκή δεξαμενή (think tank) europian concil on foregin relation Greece
and Macedonia need to distinguish between issues where they can agree to
disagree and those where they need to agree.
This article argues that the current window of
opportunity must be seized and provides a roadmap to resolving the Macedonian
Name Dispute. It argues that the dispute needs to be addressed under the
principles of freedom, responsibility and mutual recognition.
In this spirit, the two sides need to distinguish
between issues where they can agree to disagree and those where they need to
agree; they need to agree to the goal for their negotiations; and they need to
agree on a breakthrough and a roadmap.
They also need to agree on a story, that Macedonia is
a region shared between several states which must all abstain from “identity
monopoly.”
On this ground, a new permanent name can be agreed to
and its adoption for international, not domestic purposes, can be linked to
NATO membership and EU negotiations. Name options are mapped out through three
levels of specificity, where the authors indicate what they believe to be the
pros and cons of each option.
What should be the new name of the Republic of
Macedonia, currently referred to internationally as the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)?
This issue has dogged not only its relations with
Greece, but to some extent the stability of the Balkans since 1991. While the
Republic of Macedonia (or FYROM) promotes the intuitive principle that
countries ought to choose their own names, Greeks have legitimate concerns over
identity, history and geopolitics.
We believe that there is today a window of opportunity
to resolve this dispute. Both the Greek and Macedonian governments are
committed to a solution and therefore, presumably, to selling at home the
compromises that this may entail.
The new Macedonian Prime Minister, Zoran Zaev, has
clearly distanced himself from what some have referred to as the “Kitsh
patriotism” or “antiquarianism” of his predecessor, Nikola Gruevski, who
launched the monuments project Skopje 2014.
For instance, since his election Zaev has indicated a
willingness to accommodate Greek concerns by discussing changing the name of
Skopje’s Alexander the Great airport. And the two foreign ministers, Mr Nikos
Kotzias and Nikola Dimitrov have met and will meet again to discuss the
prospects for resolving the name dispute.
In order to grasp this opportunity, discussions on a
deal should be grounded in the principles of freedom, responsibility and mutual
recognition.
Freedom. While the deal needs to be respectful of
historical and identity concerns, people must ultimately free themselves from
these concerns. Historians should not try to be diplomats, and diplomats should
not rewrite history to serve their purpose. We cannot remain prisoners of
contested readings of history.
Responsibility. The leaders of the two countries, but
also their publics, have a responsibility to the next generation, which must be
freed from this burden. Windows of opportunity can close fast, and best intentions
get derailed as parties lose sight of the prize.
All compromises hurt, all create risks for
politicians, especially if they have to do with identity issues. Moderates must
ignore accusations of treason, and arrive at a deal for the sake of future
generations.
Mutual Recognition. Ultimately, this is an exercise in
mutually recognizing each other’s dignity and good faith. In order to be truly
transformative, each side needs to recognize not only the other side’s identity
stories, sovereignty concerns and territorial integrity fears, but also their
recognition: I recognize and trust that you recognize my sovereignty.
If we accept these guiding principles, how do we
operationalize them? First, the two sides need to distinguish between issues
where they can agree to disagree, and those where they need to agree.
The first type of issue will require continued
dialogue, involving historical or cultural Commissions and the likes. They
include respective interpretations of history, interpretations which of course
are not monolithic on each side.
Also in this basket are Greek fears of irredentism
from the other side, not only regarding territorial ambitions but also what are
considered offensive claims about the so called ‘Macedonian minority’ in
Greece.
There are good reasons to believe that these concerns
are unfounded (ICJ judgement of December 5, 2011). But such highly political
symbolic negotiations are about addressing the other side’s grievances, not
one’s own beliefs.
And while concerns regarding irredentism can be
addressed through a formal declaration in the agreement itself, they can only
be truly dealt with over time through confidence building and joint initiatives
on textbooks and the like. This leaves much on which the two parties need to
agree to today.
Second, the negotiating parties need to agree to the
goal for their negotiations. Something like: the goal of these negotiations is
to agree on a sound basis for future neighbourly relations through honest and
sincere mutual recognition between our countries and our peoples.
Third, the upcoming negotiations need to produce both
a breakthrough and a roadmap.
1.The breakthrough has to do with the name dispute and
the immediate commitments that go along with it. For example, agreement on a
name will immediately allow for a start of EU negotiations and lifting the veto
on membership of NATO - both to be conducted under the new permanent name.
2.The roadmap has to do with the process by which the
agreement will become embedded at the domestic and international level (see
implementation below).
What then of the name?
Here the two parties will need to display creativity
and courage in equal measure. We summarise in the graph below what we believe
the range of options are and the principles behind them.
Level 1: The Narrative
The parties need to start with a clear story - that
this is a shared region inherited from times preceding the “nation-state” era.
This is hardly controversial.
Concretely, “Macedonia” is not a brand name but a
region with shifting boundaries over many centuries, a region which is today
overlaid by three or four modern nation-states. This is not just a technical
issue about separating a region (spanning many states) and a state.
The original conflict between the two countries can be
summarised as two sides bent on “identity monopoly.” Calling the country only
Macedonia was perceived by Greeks to deny them their own Macedonian identity.
The Greek retort that there should not be ‘Macedonia’
in their northern neighbour’s name at all constitutes an equally blatant
attempt to monopolise the Macedonian identity for Greece. “Macedonia” should
not be monopolized as an identity marker by any of the states of that region.
The truth of the matter is that national identities do
not descend from heaven or ascend from the earth. They are constructed, like
all social phenomena.
So this story is about sharing a collective identity,
albeit a fluid one, that must be shared both by individuals who can choose to
call themselves whatever they want, and by their respective countries.
But here is the twist: as part of sharing the overall
“Macedonian” identity, we must mutually recognise and respect our different
(national) versions of what this identity might mean. So we must agree to
disagree about the historical validity of this and that claim.
But by the same token, we need to agree on a name that
will reflect such recognition for all sides. Greek politicians need a name
which will allow them to retain the Greek stamp over the ancient past of
Macedonia as a region for domestic purposes, regardless of whether or not the
rest of humanity cares.
Equally, their northern neighbours need to be
reassured that Greece will stop branding them as only Serbs or Bulgarians. Let
they be free whoever wants to proclaim: I am Macedonian too.
Level 2. Principle - Variations on Macedonia +
From the general idea of “a shared region” many names
follow. We see three generic categories:
The first is the current constitutional name of the
country, eg The Republic of Macedonia,which arguably does not deny the right of
others to the name in the same way as “The Republic of Ireland” does not claim
to be the whole of the island of Ireland.
Proponents for leaving the name unchanged can thus
argue that regions are regions and states are states. But Greeks on their side
hear this as a technical and disingenuous argument which leaves the identity
problem intact.
They do not read “Republic of” (or the shorthand, R.
Macedonia) as a qualifier on identity monopoly. After all, a great many
countries around the world are “Republic of” which is invariably translated in
the simple name. Who nowadays calls The French Republic anything else but
France?
To be sure, there is a state of Luxembourg and also a
province of Luxembourg which is a part of Wallonia in Belgium. But if someone
introduces herself as from Luxembourg, how many will guess that she might be
from Belgium?!
This is not a
happy prospect for the Greek side. In other words, to retain the status quo is
at best perceived on the Greek side as ‘shared identity with hierarchy’ and at
worse as just a version of ‘identity monopoly’.
This leaves two other categories which both involve
qualifying the name Macedonia through a composite name, or retaining “Republic
of”, followed by a composite name.
Level 3.
Options - Qualifiers to indicate distinct entities
Here again we see three categories, each privileging a
certain approach to distinguishing between the region of Macedonia and the
state in question and each approaching the challenge of “sharing identity” in a
different way.
One qualifier is to leave “Republic of Macedonia”
intact, as in Republic of Macedonia (Skopje), an option which was accepted by
both sides at different points in time.
This option has the advantage of constituting a simple
and accurate amendment to the current name. But some on the Greek side fear
that the qualifier “Skopje” will have the magic property of progressively
disappearing over time, like “Republic” itself.
Could such concerns be addressed in the agreement?
An alternative way of leaving “Republic of Macedonia”
intact would be that of a qualifier in front eg “Northern Republic of
Macedonia.” But this option can appear illogical and confusing since there is
no “Southern Republic of Macedonia”.
The idea of a composite name as a qualifier, under any
of its variants, has been supported officially by Greece and the UN since the
mid-1990s. Indeed, Cyrus Vance, the first UN mediator, apparently generated
scores of plausible variants, none of which were accepted in the end at that
time.
Indeed a composite name continues to be opposed by
many people on both sides even though this would be the most obvious
compromise. Specifically:
Slavic Macedonia has to do with a distinction based on
ethnicity, Slavs vs Greeks, but runs into the immediate objection of the fate
of non-Slav population or other ethnic communities in the country (mainly
ethnic Albanians) and the problematic grounds for building a nation on ethnic
rather than civic grounds.
Extending the names to Slav-Albania Macedonia does not
satisfy anyone either. Since this story is about geography and territory, other
proposals revolve around locating the Republic itself as Vardar, Upper,
Northern, Central, or even European Macedonia. In a way, these are simple
geographical descriptors which were at one point favoured by the Greek side in
their conference of parties.
Vardar (confusingly, also the Greek name for the river
Axios) raises more problems than it solves, as significant parts of the current
territory of the country were administrated by the Serbs as Vardarska Banovina
before WWI, thus reminding ethnic Albanians of their unhappy status at the
time.
Northern and Upper (with different connotations) are
perceived as a more neutral geographical variant so far, not offensive to
either side, and inclusive of Albanians.
To be sure, they can be disputed from a Bulgarian
angle, where a more accurate descriptor would be Western. But Bulgarians have
different concerns than the name anyway. Ironically,
Central Macedonia has the advantage of the qualifier “central” which is notoriously ambiguous (think of
central Europe which is truly eastern Europe) and has a positive
connotation. Some like European
Macedonia to refer to the European perspective and orientation of the country,
but then what would be the non-European Macedonia?
Alternatively, New or Nova Macedonia relies on
chronology and the fact that the state was created either in 1945 as a state in
Yugoslavia or in 1991 as an independent state following the breakup of
Yugoslavia, but in any case after the other states which share what we refer to
here as the region of Macedonia. Proponents – including us - argue that this
simply underlines a factual point and implies a positive connotation, like New
York or New Zealand.
Aside from pointing out that this is already the name
of a daily paper, opponents fear that this option will imply a break with the
Antiquarian connection or the roots of the country in 9th century Slavic
immigration. But by implying that Macedonia is a civic not an ethnic nation, New
Macedonia would encapsulate a message in a name:
this is a modern nation indeed looking to the future
and not to the past. Finally, New Macedonia clearly states: Let us leave the
fights over Alexandre the Great’s legacy behind us.
A third and further variation is for each of these to
be preceded by the words Republic of, which has the advantage of familiarity
with regards to the (domestically used) status quo name of Republic of
Macedonia.
Implementation:
Conditions for Success
Is one of these many variations acceptable to the
parties?
We believe so, under three sets of conditions.
The first condition has to do with the story that
comes along with it. That this is a name which is about reconciliation and
sharing the region of Macedonia (level 1) and therefore for international
consumption: it does not impinge upon people’s lives, or dictate how they
should call themselves and their language.
This is not about self definition, but about formal
external definition. Greeks will have to accept that their northern neighbours
call themselves ‘Macedonians’ too, just as these Macedonians will have to
accept that Greeks must feel unthreatened by whatever permanent international
name they agree to.
The story should also be about what is actually
changing, eg that this is not a change of name for the country but rather the
adoption of a permanent international name to replace a
provisionalinternational name (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).
The second set of conditions is that the benefits that
will come along with the adoption of this new name will be tangible,
significant, and immediately visible: speedy membership in NATO, the start of
accession negotiations with the EU, access to EU funds and support that go
along with it, and other cooperative ventures.
Various plans have been produced over the years which
put more or less emphasis on sequencing in order to compensate for the relative
lack of trust between the two countries at this stage (Skopje views Athens as a
powerful neighbour which can wield its veto over NATO and EU membership at any
time;
Athens fears that when it loses that leverage, Skopje
can break any agreement on a name without consequences).
One plan proposed by ESI suggests that the name change
to be enshrined immediately in the constitution only be effective initially in
international relations (wherever FYROM was used before).
to eventually be entrenched in the Macedonian Constitution (and therefore
used erga omnes) with a referendum to take place on the eve of the country’s
accession to the EU – the question being: do you agree to enter the EU under
this name?
Such an approach has the advantage of allowing each
side to retain leverage until the moment comes. The disadvantage is that the
issue would not be settled fast. Indeed, EU accession might not be on the cards
for more than a decade.
Other options would entail a Macedonian referendum
immediately after the agreement, asking whether Macedonian citizens agree to
starting negotiations with the EU and entering NATO under this permanent name
to be enshrined in the Constitution. This would be more risky but also clearer
to the public.
Finally, a third set of conditions have to do with the
kind of confidence building and dialogue over the issues where each side have
for the moment agreed to disagree as mentioned at the outset. Clearly, fears of
irredentism cannot be address by a name but must be addressed by a process.
Every name option mentioned above (level 3) can be
interpreted as leaving room for irredentism or as opening a space for further
mutual dialogue: that is up to future initiatives and the real and true
practice of mutual recognition.
In the end, this is a story not only of rapprochement
but also reconciliation that calls for imaginative and broad-based exchanges
between the two societies. On this last count, we would like to introduce one
last symbolic suggestion in addition to the above scenario.
Why not build a brand new Centre for Macedonian
Exchanges on the point at the boundary between the three countries which, if
one visits today, appears ominously as the middle of nowhere (near Tumba Peak
in Belasica).
There are around 160 tri-country points in the world.
One of the most beautiful one is the shared Iguazu waterfalls at the
intersection of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay. Why not make our very special
Balkan one a symbol of a regional identity that is shared and therefore jointly
owned, a symbol of transnational reconciliation?
Veton Latifi is professor of International Relations
at the South East European University, Tetovo, Republic of Macedonia. Kalypso
Nicolaidis is an ECFR council member and professor of International Relations
at the University of Oxford, UK.
We would like to thank the participants of the SEESOX
workshop on the Macedonian Name Dispute who met in Oxford on November 18th 2017
for an honest and thorough exchange of ideas.
Seehttps://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/research-centres/south-east-european-studies-oxford
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